Moreover, forensic tools (e.g., cell-site simulators, hacking warrants) operate opaquely. The presumption of innocence requires that the accused can challenge the integrity of evidence. But when the evidence is an algorithm’s output or a proprietary tool’s analysis, meaningful challenge is often impossible. This creates a de facto reversal: the accused must prove the technology erred, rather than the state proving its reliability.
The principle of presumed innocent is not a natural feature of online spaces; it is a hard-won legal achievement that must be deliberately reconstructed for the digital age. Without intervention, the default architecture of networks—automated, opaque, and instantaneous—will continue to invert the presumption, punishing first and hearing later. But with targeted procedural reforms, private and public actors can restore the essential balance: no punishment without process, and every accused remains innocent until proven otherwise. presumed innocent en ligne
This paper investigates the following question: To what extent does the principle of presumed innocent apply in online environments, and what normative framework should govern its application? The analysis proceeds in three parts. First, a conceptual overview of the presumption in traditional jurisprudence. Second, a diagnosis of three zones of inversion: platform moderation, digital evidence, and networked vigilantism. Third, a proposal for procedural reforms grounded in "digital due process." Moreover, forensic tools (e